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The Deliberative Process Privilege in Kentucky
By Erin Hoffman*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kentucky, administrative agencies struggle with the issue of
whether records that may expose their decision-making process to
scrutiny must be turned over to the public at large. Private citizens,
parties to litigation, or the media may make requests for such
information for a variety of reasons. A question exists as to whether
state governmental agencies may assert a privilege known as the
deliberative process privilege. This privilege has also been referred to
as "governmental" or "executive" privilege.
The deliberative process privilege insulates certain government
documents from disclosure to the general public and private parties in
litigation with the government. The privilege, which protects
documents generated within government agencies as part of the
decision-making process, originated in common law. A federal right to
the deliberative process privilege is recognized under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). Many states have recognized the privilege for
state agencies under statutes similar to the Kentucky Open Records
Act, which mirrors FOIA. However, Kentucky has not officially
recognized a deliberative process privilege for state administrative
agencies.
Part II of this note examines the history and purpose of the
deliberative process privilege. Next, Part III analyzes the current,
ambiguous status of the deliberative process privilege in Kentucky.
Part IV of the note examines foreign state precedent recognizing the
deliberative process privilege. Finally, Part V suggests Kentucky
should use the persuasive authority of other states' interpretation of
similarly worded statutes as a model and officially recognize the
deliberative process privilege. In Part VI, the note concludes by
stressing that the privilege is necessary to maintain the free flow of
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ideas and ongoing evaluation of policy among state agencies and
Kentucky's need to adopt it.
II. PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND OF THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS
PRIVILEGE
The deliberative process privilege is a commonly recognized
confidentiality privilege exclusive to government agencies.' The
privilege originates in common law, rules of evidence, and primarily
from rules governing discovery in civil proceedings. 2 Early American
cases recognized an executive privilege protecting deliberations of the
president derived from English "crown privilege" precedent.3 The case
law involving the deliberative process privilege as we know it today
began to emerge in the late 1930's.4 The deliberative process privilege
exempts government agencies from divulging documents reflecting
recommendations, opinions or deliberations involved in creating
governmental decisions and policies.' The privilege is meant to protect
an official's ability to communicate openly without fear that each idea
may be revealed through discovery or the media. 6 Additionally, the
deliberative process privilege shields the public from the confusion that
results from exposure to a policy or idea before it is officially adopted.7
Further, because the public is ultimately affected by the final decisions
of government agencies, not the process used to arrive at such
decisions, they should not be hindered by this lack of access. Thus, the
privilege improves "the quality of agency decisions" by shielding
candid discussions among agency officials making those decisions.
8
With the introduction of disclosure statutes such as FOIA, the
deliberative process privilege was incorporated into exemption
1. City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1047 (Colo. 1998).
2. Stromberg Metal Works v. Univ. of Md., 844 A.2d 1220, 1227 (Md. 2004).
3. Russell V. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege,
54 Mo. L. REv. 279, 284 (1989).
4. Id. at 286.
5. Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Assoc., 532 U.S. 1,
7(2001).
6. Id. at 8-9.
7. Spinner v. City of New York, No. 01CV2715(CPS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2541, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2004).
8. Klamath, 532 U.S. at 9.
provisions.9 The deliberative process privilege is commonly discussed
in reference to the FOIA, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552. The FOIA
requires disclosure of a government agency's records. 10 However,
some documents are exempt under § 552(b). Exemption § 552(b)(5) is
often cited as "the deliberative process privilege." 1' The exemption
protects documents that are "inter-agency or intra-agency
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party
other than an agency in litigation with the agency." 12 The exemption
covers subjective documents reflecting the personal opinion of the
writer rather than the policy of the agency, such as draft documents,
recommendations, proposals, and suggestions.13
In order to be exempt from discovery under the deliberative
process privilege, a document must be both "predecisional" and
"deliberative." 14 To be deemed predecisional, an agency must prove
a document was created prior to a final decision on the subject matter
discussed and facilitated arrival at that decision. 
1 5
The deliberative process privilege serves to protect the
government's ongoing evaluation of policy.16 This process generates
documents that may not result in a final agency decision.17
Therefore, a document need not be tied to a specific decision in order
to be deemed predecisional. 18 Regardless of whether specific action
will be taken on a subordinate's ideas, forcing disclosure of
documents created in the deliberative process may prevent candid
communication between subordinates and superiors.
19
Courts may consider the history of a memorandum when
deciding whether or not a document is predecisional.20 Documents
9. Stromberg, 854 A.2d at 1227.
10. Klamath, 532 U.S. at 8.
11. Id.
12.5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5).
13. Schell v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 843 F.2d 933, 936 (6th Cir.
1988).
14. Rugiero v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 257 F.3d 534, 550 (6th Cir. 2001).
15. Spinner, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2541, at *4.
16. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 153 (1975).
17. Id.
18. Schell, 843 F.2d 933 at 941.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 942.
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sent from subordinates to superiors are likely to be predecisional,
whereas a document sent from a superior to a subordinate will more
often instruct staff on policies already adopted. 1
In order to be deliberative, documents must be part of a
consultative process, providing recommendations or opinions on
policy or legal matters. 22 Purely factual, investigative matters that
could be excised without revealing the remainder of a document are
not protected. 3
Lastly, the deliberative process privilege is not absolute.24
Agencies cannot use the process to create laws kept secret from the
public at their whim.2 ' Those subject to an agency's regulations deserve
fair notice of the agency's requirements.2 6 Agencies may not protect
documents in order to avoid public scrutiny.27  In addition, a
deliberative document may be disclosed if the party seeking that
information proves its need for discovery outweighs the government's
need for nondisclosure. 28 Factors to be balanced include the relevance
of the information sought, the accessibility of other evidence, and the
gravity of the litigation or issues involved.29  However, the most
important question in applying the deliberative process privilege is
whether turning over documents would reveal an agency's deliberative
process in a manner that could stifle the exchange of ideas and weaken
the agency's ability to fulfill its role.30
Litigants and the public at large may pursue deliberative process
materials for many reasons.31 Some believe access to deliberative
21. Id.
22. Spinner, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2541, at *4.
23. Norwood v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 993 F.2d 570, 576-77 (6th Cir. 1993).
24. Elkem Metals Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2000).
25. Weaver, supra note 3, at 291.
26. Id.
27. Elkem Metals Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 574.
28. Id.
29. Nelson v Prod. Credit Ass'n. of the Midlands, 131 F.R.D. 161, 164 (D.
Neb. 1989).
30. Dudman Commc'ns v. Dep't of the Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565, 1568 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
31. Jones, supra note 3, at 280.
statements will provide a better understanding of the agency itself.32
Others believe they can overturn an agency action using deliberative
process materials as proof of contemporaneous construction.33 Also,
some want access to facts contained in predecisional materials that
could not easily be redacted and cannot be obtained outside the
government.34
III. KENTUCKY LAW REGARDING THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS
PRIVILEGE REMAINS UNCLEAR
The Kentucky Open Records Act (KORA) provides exemptions
similar to § 552(b)(5) of FOIA, often called the deliberative process
privilege. Kentucky's Open Records Act 35 provides exceptions for
certain governmental communications. Excluded under the Act are
"preliminary drafts, notes, correspondence with private individuals,
other than correspondence which is intended to give notice of final
action of a public agency" and "preliminary recommendations, and
preliminary memoranda in which opinions are expressed or policies
are formulated or recommended.,
36
Based on the KORA, some Kentucky precedent suggests a
deliberative process privilege is available to state administrative
agencies. A disclosure request under KORA was at issue in Beckham
v. Board of Education.37  The Courier-Journal requested records
related to grievances filed and discipline taken against present and
past school board employees, as well as files outlining decisions not
to take action based on complaints.38 Board employees sought to
have certain records excluded on the basis that the records did not
represent final action on the part of the Board.39 When the trial court
and court of appeals ordered the Board to disclose the documents,
appellant employees sought discretionary review with the Kentucky
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.870 - 61.884 (West 2005).
36. Id. § 61.878 (1)(i)-(j).
37. Beckham v. Bd. of Educ. 873 S.W.2d 575 (Ky. 1994).
38. Id. at 575.
39. Id. at 576.
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Supreme Court.4 0 The supreme court sought to give effect to the
intent of the General Assembly in enacting KORA. 4 1 The Courier-
Journal argued the act must be interpreted only as a remedy for denial
of access, not to protect agencies. 42 Despite the General Assembly's
evident intent to enact a disclosure statute, the supreme court
concluded that certain records would be exempt from disclosure.43
Therefore, the court of appeals decision was reversed. 44 Kentucky
Supreme Court Justice Lambert's interpretation of sections
61.878(1)(i)-(j) in Beckham implies the deliberative process privilege
is available to state agencies:
From the exclusions we must conclude that with
respect to certain records, the General Assembly has
determined that the public's right to know is
subservient to statutory rights of personal privacy and
the need for government confidentiality. A cursory
examination of KRS 61.878 reveals an extensive list
of matters excluded from public access, and this also
suggests an absence of legislative intent to create
unrestricted access to records. "
Additionally, the Kentucky Court of Appeals later cited
Lambert's argument in Courier-Journal v. Jones.4 6  In Jones,
appellant newspaper requested access to Governor Brereton C.
Jones's appointment ledgers for various time periods.47  The
appellate court noted that it was unclear what information the media
sought or for what purpose, leading them to conclude their efforts
were a "fishing expedition upon which to base some speculative
publication., 48 Thus, the appellate court held that the concept of
40. Id. at 577.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 578.
43. Id. at 577.
44. Id. at 579.
45. Id. at 578.
46. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co. v. Jones, 895 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1995)
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id.
25-2
Government confidentiality was not completely diluted by the Open
Records Act.49 Kentucky Revised Statute section 61.870 (1) (h), now
(i), was the crux of Jones's argument.5" In denying the request for
Jones's schedule, the supreme court quoted the California Supreme
Court's treatment of a factually similar case in Times Mirror Co v.
Superior Court of Sacramento:
If the law required disclosure of a private meeting
between the Governor and a politically unpopular or
controversial group, that meeting might never occur.
Compelled disclosure could thus devalue or eliminate
altogether a particular viewpoint from the Governor's
consideration. Even routine meetings between the
Governor and other lawmakers, lobbyists, or citizen's
groups might be inhibited if the meetings were
regularly revealed to the public and the participants
routinely subjected to probing questions and scrutiny
by the press. "
Moreover, the Jones Court cited an opinion of the attorney
general regarding a media request for the mayor of Louisville's
appointment calendar:
Not every paper in the office of a public agency is a
public record subject to public inspection. Many
papers are simply work papers which are exempted
because they are preliminary drafts and notes. KRS
61.878 (1)(g) . . . Such preliminary drafts and notes
and preliminary memoranda are part of the tools
which a public employee uses in hammering out
official action within the function of his office. They
are expressly exempted by the Open Records Law and
may be destroyed or kept at will and are not subject to
public inspection.52
49.Id. at 7-8.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 7 (quoting Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 813 P.2d 240, 251
(Cal. 1991)).
52. Jones, 895 S.W.2d at 8 (citations omitted).
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The court of appeals ruled the appointment schedule was a
notation for inter or intra office use, ensuring order in the affairs of
the Governor.53 It represented a draft of what may or may not occur,
rather than a final decision.5 4 Further, it was in the public's interest
to withhold the Governor's schedule.55
The appellate court's decision in Jones evinces intent to construe
the exception clause in the KORA as allowing the deliberative
process privilege for government agencies. The Jones court was
clearly persuaded by the opinion of the California Supreme Court,
which expressly recognized a deliberative process privilege for state
government. The appellate court noted that Kentucky and
California's open records acts were not identical. 56 Nonetheless, they
found the logic of the California Supreme Court to be useful. The
court also construed the exception clause in a manner consistent with
federal and state courts that recognize the deliberative process
privilege. In addition, the court stressed the importance of
withholding certain documents from disclosure in order to protect
both the government and the public at large. 57
Another case, Commonwealth of Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v.
Graham, implies the Kentucky Supreme Court's recognition of the
deliberative process privilege.58 In Graham, the Kentucky Revenue
Cabinet argued executive privilege protected certain documents from
in camera review. 59 The Kentucky Supreme Court deemed the in
camera review of documents appropriate. 60  The court never
challenged the Revenue Cabinet's claim of executive privilege or
questioned its existence. 61 Further, they appeared to acknowledge
the purpose of such a privilege, noting the in camera procedure
would not have "a chilling effect on the Revenue Cabinet's decision
53. Id. at 10.
54. Id.
55.Id. at 7.
56. Id. at8.
57. Id.
58. Commonwealth of Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Graham, 710 S.W.2d 227
(Ky. 1986).
59. Id. at 228.
60. Id. at 229.
61. See id.
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making process inasmuch as the Circuit Court alone, in camera, will
be involved in the review. After that only that deemed non-
privileged will be disseminated.,
62
However, some sources contradict the existence of a deliberative
process privilege in Kentucky. In Weaver v. Commonwealth, the
prosecuting attorney wished to withhold an audiotape of a drug bust,
based on a so-called "police surveillance privilege." 63 The Kentucky
Supreme Court overturned an earlier case, Jett v. Commonwealth,64
recognizing the privilege.65 In doing so, the court cited Article 5 of
section 501 of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE 501), which
provides: "Except as otherwise provided by Constitution or statute or
by these or other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky, no person has a privilege to ... [r]efuse to disclose any
matter. "
6 6
The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the appellate court
overstepped its bounds by acknowledging a privilege not specifically
mentioned by statute or supreme court opinions.67  The Weaver
opinion casts some doubt on the existence of the deliberative process
privilege. While the KORA may imply a deliberative process
privilege exists, like the police surveillance privilege discussed, it is
not expressly recognized in the statute or a Supreme Court opinion.
In addition, in the Kentucky Law Evidence Handbook, author
Robert G. Lawson questions whether a deliberative process privilege
can be claimed in light of KRE 501 .68 Lawson considers the Graham
decision "slight" evidence of supreme court adoption of the privilege,
but notes that the case decision predates the adoption of the KRE 501
in 1998.69 According to Lawson, KRE 501 functions to prevent the
withholding of evidence.7v Supporting this argument is a statement
62. Id.
63. Weaver v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 722, 727 (Ky. 1997).
64. Id. at 727, discussing Jett v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Ky.
1993).
65. Id.
66. Id (citing KY. R. EvID. 501).
67. Id.
68. ROBERT G. LAWSON, THE KENTUCKY LAW EVIDENCE HANDBOOK, § 5.25
(3d ed. 2002).
69. Id. § 5.25.
70. Id. § 5.05.
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by the drafters of KRE 501: "The Federal Rules of Evidence ...
relegate the entire subject of privilege to common law. In Kentucky,
however, privileges are codified -- by these Rules and by the
Kentucky Revised Statutes, and it is appropriate, therefore, to include
a rule which embodies the general obligation to testify."'"
Finally, though Lawson believes the language of KRE 501 is
more indicative of intent to abolish, rather than preserve privileges,
ultimate resolution of the matter rests with the Kentucky Supreme
Court.
72
In light of the contrary authority in Kentucky, the Commonwealth
would benefit from a clear directive by the Kentucky Supreme Court
endorsing the existence of the deliberative process privilege.
Shielding the pre-decisional process gives an agency the liberty to
"think out loud," allowing them to try out ideas and argue policy
unrestrained by the peril of these speculative but rejected ideas
becoming topics of public discussion.73 Also, clarifying the issue
would instruct private citizens on what documents they may review
and alert public agencies as to what may be withheld.
IV. TRENDS IN STATE OPEN RECORDS STATUTES AND THE
RECOGNITION OF THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE
Over twenty years ago, authors Braverman and Heppler
suggested state courts should look to federal cases interpreting the
FOIA when construing their open records laws.74 Because several
state statutes were modeled after the FOIA, federal precedent would
prove pertinent.75 The authors suggested federal precedent would be
especially helpful in dealing with state open records act
exemptions.76 Today, many states have recognized exemptions in
their open records acts similar to exemption five of the FOIA. These
similarities have led state courts to conclude that their open records
71. Id. § 5.00. (quoting EVIDENCE RULES STUDY COMMITTEE, KENTUCKY
RULES OF EVIDENCE - FINAL DRAFT 38-39 (Nov. 1989)).
72. Id.
73. Wilson v. Super. Ct., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 541 (Ct. App. 1996).
74. Bert A. Braverman & Wesley R. Heppler, A Practical Review of State
Open Records Laws, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 720, 727 (1981).
75. Id.
76. Id.
act exemptions establish a deliberative process privilege for state
agencies identical to the deliberative process privilege incorporated
into the FOIA for federal agencies.
A. Colorado
The Supreme Court of Colorado officially acknowledged the
deliberative process privilege in 1998. In City of Colorado Springs v.
White, David White requested copies of an internal evaluation of the
Community Services Department of the City of Colorado Springs,
performed by an outside consultant.77 The report contained results of
an examination of the Industrial Training Division, a unit under the
management of the Community Services Department.78 The head of
the Community Services Department invoked the deliberative
process privilege, denying disclosure under section 24-72-204
(3)(a)(IV) of Colorado's statutes, which exempts disclosure of
"[t]rade secrets, privileged information, and confidential commercial,
financial, geological, or geophysical data furnished by or obtained
from any person. 79  White argued that the deliberative process
privilege did not exist in Colorado so the Community Services
Department had no foundation for denying his request. 80 The trial
court held that open records laws exempted documents protected by
the deliberative process privilege.81 However, the Colorado Court of
Appeals reversed, noting that federal authority recognizes a
deliberative process privilege but found "no corollary authority in
Colorado law." 82 Therefore, citizens were entitled to the report under
Colorado's open records laws.83
The Community Services Department sought review from the
Colorado Supreme Court, asserting the deliberative process privilege
exists at common law, independent of open records laws or the
77. City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Colo. 1998).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1046 (citing COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-72-204 (1998)).
80. City of Colorado Springs, 967 P.2d at 1046.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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FOIA. 84 The Colorado Supreme Court noted that neither FOIA nor
Colorado's open records laws mention the deliberative process
privilege by name. 85 However, the court determined the material
covered by the privilege was protected by general reference to
discovery principles.86 The Supreme Court noted that neither FOIA
nor Colorado's open records laws mention the deliberative process
privilege by name.87 Since the common law deliberative process
privilege predated the enactment of the open records laws, the
statutes did not have to identify it specifically in order for it to be
preserved. 88  The Community Services Department document in
question contained observations about the working environment of
the Industrial Training Division and was pre-decisional because it
was designed to help petitioners develop strategies to better the
division.89  The report was also deliberative, composed of
employees' candid and personal views as to the strengths and
weaknesses of the Industrial Training Division and its director.9 ° The
court agreed with the trial court; knowledge that these opinions could
be exposed to the public would discourage this type of frank
discussion in the future.
9
'
B. West Virginia
West Virginia's Freedom of Information Act (WVFOIA) has
been found to provide a deliberative process privilege for state
92 I
agencies. In Daily Gazette v. West Virginia Development Office, a
newspaper made requests for information regarding a pulp mill
proposed for construction. 93 The development office released some
document but withheld others on the ground they were internal
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1049.
86. Id. at 1055.
87. Id. at 1049.
88. Id. at 1049.
89. Id. at 1057.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. The Daily Gazette Co. v. W. Va. Dev. Office, 482 S.E.2d 180, 191 (W.Va.
1996) (citing W. VA. CODE § 29B-1 -1 (1977)).
93. Id.
memoranda exempt from disclosure under WVFOIA.94 Section 29B
1-4(8) of the WVFOIA provides a disclosure exemption for
"[i]nternal Memoranda or letters prepared or received by any public
body." 95  The West Virginia Court of Appeals found that the
Development Office had failed to prove all of the items were
deliberative, internal memoranda protected by the privilege.
However, items actually consisting of opinions, advice, or
recommendations reflecting the offices deliberations would be
exempt from disclosure. 96 The court of appeals acknowledged that
the deliberative process privilege wording of FOIA exemption five
differs from that of WVFOIA exemption eight.97 Despite this, it still
interpreted the two clauses as consistent with one another.98 Noting
the close relationship between the two statutes, it found federal
precedent valuable in construing the state's similar provisions.99
Therefore, WVFOIA exemption eight creates a deliberative process
privilege exempting from disclosure:
Written internal government communications
consisting of advice, opinions and recommendations
which reflect a public body's deliberative, decision
making process; written advice, opinions and
recommendations from one public body to another;
and written advice, opinions, and recommendations to
a public body from outside consultants or experts
obtained during the public body's deliberative,
decision making process.'00
94. Id.
95. Id. at 183 (citation omitted).
96. Id. at 192.
97. Id. at 191 (citing W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-8 (1977).
98. Id. at 180.
99. Id. at 188.
100. Id. at 192 (citing § 29B-1-8).
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C. Texas
Texas courts have interpreted the Texas Public Information Act 1°'
(TPIA) as providing an exception for the deliberative process
privilege. 10 2 The provision was interpreted in City of Garland v.
Dallas Morning News, where a dispute arose when a newspaper
requested a memorandum detailing the city finance director's
termination and the wrongful acts that formed the basis for his
termination. 10 3 The memoranda was copied and circulated among
city council members. Later, a settlement was reached with the
finance director and he resigned. 104 The City Development Office
sought to exclude the memorandum pursuant to Section 552.111 of
TPIA, while the newspaper argued that there was no deliberative
process privilege available to Texas state agencies. 0 5 The court
found the memorandum at issue was not exempt from disclosure
because it did divulge decisions related to public policy.1
0 6
However, in deciding the issue the court also held that the Act's
agency memoranda exception included a deliberative process
privilege for state agencies.' 0 7 Section 552.111, the exemption clause
of the TPIA, contains language nearly identical to that found in 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), the federal Freedom of Information Act.'018
Because the legislature modeled the state act on the FOIA, the court
presumed the legislature knew of, and intended to, accept the federal
court's construction of the FOIA. 10 9 Hence, the Supreme Court of
Texas held that section 552.111 of the Texas Code incorporated the
deliberative process privilege." 0
101. TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 552.001 (Vernon 1994).
102. City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex.
2000).
103. Id. at 354.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 360.
106. Id. at 364.
107. Id. at 368.
108. Id.; see also Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2000 &
Supp. 11); supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
109. City of Garland, 22 S.W.3d at 368.
110. Id.
D. California
Like Texas and other states, California has consistently followed
the reasoning of federal courts in construing the California Public
Records Act.111 In Wilson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
a reporter used the California Public Records Act to request
"documents which describe or contain the names and background
information about" people who applied for a seat on the Orange
County Board of Supervisors.' 12 California's governor at the time,
Pete Wilson, declined; the Los Angeles Times, filed a writ of
mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. 113 The court
granted the newspaper's petition, holding that disclosure of the
completed application forms would not impose on the deliberative
process. 1 4 However, when Governor Wilson appealed the decision,
the California Court of Appeals disagreed. 5 Because California's
Public Record Act is modeled after the FOIA and the two share a
common function, "[t]he legislative history and judicial construction
of the FOIA thus 'serve to illuminate the interpretation of its
California counterpart. '""'1 6 Therefore, the court found California's
Public Record Act, like § 552(b)(5) of the FOIA, exempts documents
protected by the deliberative process privilege from disclosure. 1 17
Here, the applications were predecisional documents whose sole
function was to assist the Governor in selecting an appointee. 8 The
process depended on comparing qualifications listed in the
applications with private and candid discussions of candidate's
political ideals, competence, and behavior. 19 Further, applicants and
those providing information about them were assured information
given would only be divulged to the Governor and his senior staff in
111. Wilson v. Super. Ct., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 541 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing
Times Mirror Co. v. Super. Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Cal. 1991)); see also CAL.
GOv'T CODE § 6255 (West 2001).
112. Wilson, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 540.
115. Id. at 537.
116. Id. at 540 (quoting Times Mirror Co., 283 Cal. Rptr. at 900).
117. Id. at 541.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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order to ensure candidates would be forthcoming. 120  The court
adopted the practical approach of the California's Supreme Court in
Times Mirror Company, stating "[t]he deliberative process privilege
is grounded in the unromantic reality of politics; it rests on the
understanding that if the public and the Governor were entitled to
precisely the same information, neither would likely receive it.'
21
Though the newspaper argued that the public interest in the
appointment of high government official was great, the appellate
court applied a balancing test and found the public benefit from
nondisclosure was greater. 122
E. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania has also concurred with sister states in allowing
certain privileges for state agencies. 123 The issue was addressed in
Lavalle v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.124 A conflict arose when
Gerald Lavalle, a state senator, sought access to reports prepared by
accountants for the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
pursuant to the state's Right to Know Act. 125 The accountants had
been retained in response to a breach of contract suit brought by
administrators of an automotive emissions testing program that the
state had abandoned.126 The suit was ultimately settled for over $145
million dollars. 127 The Department of Transportation argued against
disclosure, claiming the report was part of their deliberations on the
lawsuit. 128 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that any portion of
the report that reflected on the Department of Transportation's
deliberative process was not subject to disclosure pursuant to the
Right to Know Act.' 29 Unlike other states' equivalent of FOIA, the
120. Id.
121. Id. at 542.
122. Id.
123. Lavalle v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 769 A.2d 449, 458 (Pa.
2001).
124. See id.
125. Id. at 451.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 452.
129. Id. at 458.
Pennsylvania's Right to Know Act,130 does not provide for a specific
exception or exclusion for records created in the deliberative
process.' 3' However, the Act described public records as "concrete
decisional implements," such as minutes, orders, decisions, accounts,
vouchers and contracts."'1 32  The court found these records
distinguishable from records that reflect the underlying thought
processes and opinions of agency employees and their agents.
Therefore, the definition of public records in the Right to Know Act
did not apply to materials that would expose the deliberative,
predecisional aspects of agency decision making to public
scrutiny.' 33
The issue of agency privilege arose again in Tribune-Review
Publishing Company v. Department of Community & Economic
Development. 34  The Tribune-Review requested disclosure of
applications for state funded grants under the Community
Revitalization Program pursuant to the Right to Know Act.13 5 The
Department of Community and Economic Development denied the
request, arguing that because they had not been reduced to final,
executed contracts, and therefore, they were deliberative documents
not subject to disclosure under the Act.' 36 Initially, the trial court
ordered that the documents be released. 137  However, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed based on their decision in
Lavalle, and reversed and remanded the case. 138 On remand, the
lower court cited the importance of candid internal exchange of
information within agencies, reaffirming the deliberative process
privilege. 139
130. 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 66.1-4 (2003).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Tribune-Review Publ'g Co. v. Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 814 A.2d
1261 (Pa. 2003).
135. Id. at 1262.
136. Id. at 1263.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1264.
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F. Alaska
The Supreme Court of Alaska considered the role of the
deliberative process privilege.14 ° In Fuller v. City of Homer, a city
manager denied Abigail Fuller's request for access to documents
used in preparing a petition to annex certain areas adjoining the city
pursuant to the deliberative process privilege.' Fuller argued that
the privilege would not extend to municipalities. 142  The state
supreme court found that in the case at hand, the public interest in
obtaining the information was great and that deliberations had
ended. 143 Under the circumstances, the public interest in disclosure
outweighed the city's need for confidentiality.' However, the court
found no compelling reason why the deliberative process privilege
would not extend to municipalities under a different set of facts.
145
The Alaska Public Records Act does not contain a specific exemption
for government agencies similar to exemption five of the FOIA and
analogous state statutes, such as the KORA. 146 However, Alaska
Statute 40.25120(a)(4) provides an exemption for "records required
to be kept confidential by ... state law."' 14 7 The court noted that
Alaska's statutory definition of "state law" encompasses common
law. 148 Because the common law courts acknowledged an executive
privilege, they found the executive privilege to be one of the
judicially recognized "state law" exceptions to public access under
the public records act. 149
Further, in a recent case, Blanas v. Alaska Worker's Comp.
Board, the plaintiff, Blanas appealed numerous findings by the
Alaska Workers' Compensation Board.'5 ° Blanas claimed he would
140. Fuller v. City of Homer, 75 P.3d 1059, 1062 (Alaska 2003).
141. Id. at 1060.
142. Id. at 1064.
143. Id. at 1065.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1064.
146 ALASKA STAT. §§ 40.25.100-. 124 (2004).
147. Fuller, 75 P.3d at 1062 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 40.25.120(a)(4)
(2004)).
148. Id. at 1063.
149. Id.
150. No. 1177, 2004 LEXIS 96, at *7 (Alaska July 21, 2004).
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not have signed a Compromise and Release agreement if the attorney
representing his employer and their insurer had disclosed certain
employment training opportunities would not be available to him due
to his injuries.15 ' He sought to depose a member of the Workers'
Compensation Board, looking for evidence the Compromise and
Release Agreement would not have been approved had they been
apprised of the information in question. 152 The Board refused to
allow the deposition, arguing testimony regarding the deliberative
processes of its members should be excluded. 153 The supreme court
agreed, noting that although "it has never adopted the deliberative
process privilege by that exact name, it has adopted the executive
privilege to address the same policy concerns.-
154
G. Maryland
Maryland recently dealt with the deliberative process privilege in
Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. University of Maryland.155
Stromberg Metals Works was a subcontractor on a construction
project for the University of Maryland. 156  Stromberg became
concerned that the University lacked adequate funding when the
project began to run millions of dollars over budget. 57 Invoking
Maryland's Public Information Act (PIA), Stromberg requested
several documents related to the project including budget reports
prepared by the University's Department of Architecture,
Engineering, and Construction. 58 The University turned documents
over to the State Attorney General, custodian of public records under
the PIA, who reviewed the requested documents for any privileged
material. 59 The budget reports were submitted in redacted form.
160
In particular, dollar amounts forecasting the cost of project
151. Id. at *2.
152. Id. at *23.
153. Id. at *26.
154. Id. at *24.
155. Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., 854 A.2d 1220 (Md. 2004).
156. Id. at 1222.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1222-23.
160. Id. at 1223.
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completion and budget shortfalls wdre omitted and litigation to
obtain the records ensued.' 6 1
The University claimed the redacted information was protected
by executive privilege based on two provisions of the PIA. 162
Section 10-615(1) obligates a custodian to refuse inspection of a
public record if "by law, the public record is privileged or
confidential." 163  Section 10-618(b) allows a custodian to deny
examination of "any part of an inter-agency or intra-agency letter or
memorandum that would not be available by law to a private party in
litigation with the [governmental] unit."'164 The University argued
the financial data were not just mere numbers but a "subjective
assessment of the potential final cost to the University for the
project" provided to facilitate decisions on the quantity of resources
committed to the project and whether more funding was needed. 165
In response, the court reasoned that the deliberative process
privilege was incorporated into PIA's exemption statute, Section 10-
618(b). 166  The court held that while it was undisputed that the
reports were predecisional in nature, the financial figures were
mostly factual, not deliberative, in character. 167  Therefore, the
redacted figures were not subject to shielding under the deliberative
process privilege exemption of Section 10-618(b) of the PIA.168
V. KENTUCKY SHOULD USE OTHER STATES' PRECEDENT AS A MODEL
FOR ADOPTING THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE
Case law from other jurisdictions provides coherent, persuasive
authority for Kentucky. Kentucky should acknowledge the logic that
sister states have applied in officially recognizing the deliberative
process privilege and follow suit. Case history suggests a willingness
of state courts to recognize the wisdom of other states' construction
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 10-615(1) (LEXIS 2005)).
164. Id. at 1223-24 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 10-618(b)
(LEXIS 2005)).
165. Id. at 1224.
166. Id. at 1226-27.
167. Id. at 1228-30.
168. Id. at 1231.
when interpreting similar statutes. For example, Texas upheld the
constitutionality of a statute deeming possession of mercury without
a bill of sale a criminal act. 169 The Texas Supreme Court found
persuasive the fact that New Mexico upheld the constitutionality of a
statute on the possession of mercury nearly identical to the Texas
statute. 70 The court decided New Mexico had construed the statute
similar to theirs in a scholarly and persuasive manner when deciding
its constitutionality. 17' Finally, the Texas Supreme Court noted in
passing that "the construction placed by a court of another
jurisdiction on a statute similar to a statute of Texas will undoubtedly
be given due consideration."' 72 Also, when a corporation challenged
an interpretation of the Massachusetts Statute of Frauds, the court
found the construction of the statute was proper because states with
similarly worded statutes used that interpretation.
173
Kentucky has already followed California's lead in the Jones
case, finding their supreme courts reasoning valid when interpreting
the KORA. It appears illogical to borrow reasoning from California
courts to support an exemption from the KORA and then reject the
same state's assertion that a deliberative process privilege exists.
Further, a review of other states' open records acts reveals them to be
similarly worded to KORA.
Moreover, by enacting a state statute parallel to the FOIA, the
legislature evinces an intent that Kentucky should follow the federal
courts' construction of FOIA in interpreting the KORA. Inept or
unclear wording should not defeat the purpose of a statute. 174 If a
statute is unclear, courts must interpret the statute as to effectuate
legislative intent. 175 Federal courts have that held that Section 552
establishes a privilege to protect federal agencies' deliberative
processes. Therefore, because the exemption clause in Section
61.878 (i)-(j) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes has been subject to
different interpretations; Kentucky must look to the FOIA for clarity
169. Johnson v. State, 466 S.W.2d 744, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
170. Id. at 745-746.
171. Id. at 746.
172. Id.
173. Simpson v. Henry N. Clark Co., 55 N.E.2d 10, 11 (Mass. 1944).
174. County of Spokane v. Bates, 982 P.2d 642, 644 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
175. Id.
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and defer to legislative intent by recognizing the deliberative process
privilege.
Finally, a survey of case law from surrounding states illustrates a
pertinent point; contrary to the fears of its distracters state recognition
of the deliberative process privilege has not allowed agencies to hide
behind the privilege. In reality, litigation involving the deliberative
process privilege actually shows that the need for agency privacy is
carefully weighed against the right to public disclosure. State
agencies have to demonstrate that the harm created by nondisclosure
outweighs the public good in order to successfully invoke the
privilege.
VI. CONCLUSION
A state agency's evaluative process would suffer no less damage
from being forced to divulge predecisional documents than their
federal counterparts. Whether state or federal government is
involved, employees fear of "operating in a fishbowl." Also, public
confusion may occur when predecisional records are released,
presenting problems for administrative agencies. Arguably, the
agency operations on a local or state level have the greatest impact on
peoples' day-to-day lives. Therefore, stifling a state agency's candid
discussions and thorough debate on policy presents a public harm at
least equal to that created by exposure of federal agencies processes.
Future litigation surrounding an open records request pursuant to
KORA and a state agency's refusal under a claim of privilege is
foreseeable. The Kentucky Supreme Court must grant certiorari
when the issue is presented to them and officially recognize a
deliberative process privilege for state administrative agencies. To
do so recognizes the persuasive value of other jurisdiction's
interpretation of similar statutes, the purpose of adopting similar
federal statutes, and the importance of state agencies.
